Choose successor routing and incoming-voucher trust rules #6
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#7 Decide stalled-voucher and delivery-failure recovery
MISChaufen/prevouch
#11 Choose the application architecture and deployment contract
MISChaufen/prevouch
#12 Evaluate member and admin journeys in four live-switchable designs
MISChaufen/prevouch
#2 Establish Congress voucher replication and incoming-email evidence
MISChaufen/prevouch
#13 Obtain redacted evidence of successor-address routing
MISChaufen/prevouch
#15 Define central-purchase workflow and fulfillment
MISChaufen/prevouch
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MISChaufen/prevouch#6
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Part of #1
Question
How should prevouch choose return addresses, associate incoming vouchers with the correct event and prior assignment, and decide which messages are safe to distribute?
Use the replication research to compare return-address scopes (event, chain, or assignment), real transport recipients versus editable email headers, and what operators must configure. Decide initial-batch ingestion, parsing and validation boundaries, duplicate and replay handling, unknown or malformed messages, ambiguous correlation, and manual correction. Separate evidence the system actually receives from assumptions about purchase or payment.
The person buying from the seller must be able to copy the correct prevouch-owned return address at checkout: the member in self-purchase mode, or the Orga-team in central-purchase mode. Account email, delivery address, and return address are distinct concepts. Resolve the externally observable contract and its trust assumptions; defer provider/library selection to architecture.
Routing evidence prerequisite: Obtain redacted evidence of successor-address routing must establish the actual recipient field and trusted ingress behavior before treating per-assignment aliases as a verified integration contract. The research distinguishes routing correlation from proof of authenticity or causal lineage.
Support both purchase modes from Define central-purchase workflow and fulfillment. Decide the organizer-facing return-address and voucher-access contract for central purchases without disclosing voucher codes to members. Routing correlation must work for organizer purchases as well as self-purchases; the existing evidence prerequisite still applies.
Planning checkpoint — successor routing and incoming-voucher trust Q1–Q4
The human agreed to all four recommendations. These are inputs to this open decision, not a final resolution or a verified seller integration.
The glossary now distinguishes a held voucher and sharpens return address. Remaining discussion includes exact issuer-authentication evidence, parsing and deduplication, event/assignment conflicts and lineage, alias lifetime, multi-request central checkout, and safe operator corrections.
Obtain redacted evidence of successor-address routing remains an open native prerequisite. The selected per-assignment contract must not be described as verified until that evidence is inspected. No resolution or map Decisions-so-far entry is made at this checkpoint.
Discussion: Successor routing and incoming-voucher trust.
Planning checkpoint — successor routing and incoming-voucher trust Q5–Q10
The human agreed to Q5–Q10, adding that duplicate arrivals must be recorded and brought to the organizers' attention: the sender may be a member returning an unwanted voucher. These are inputs to this open decision, not its final resolution.
Bounded supporting research is complete in the working checkout at
docs/research/incoming-voucher-email-trust.md. Primary sources include Authentication-Results trust boundaries, DKIM header selection, and DKIM unsigned content risks. The sourced note has not been committed/published; this comment records the agreed policy independently of that local asset.Remaining questions: duplicate-notification handling and suspected returns, allowed manual approval/corrections and evidence, operational configuration and acceptance gates, and final shared understanding. Detailed safety evidence before reassigning a disclosed voucher belongs to Decide stalled-voucher and delivery-failure recovery; notification channels/preferences belong to Define delivery addresses, email templates, and notification preferences.
Obtain redacted evidence of successor-address routing remains open. No ticket is closed and no map Decisions-so-far entry is added here.
Discussion: Successor routing and incoming-voucher trust.
Planning checkpoint — successor routing and incoming-voucher trust Q11–Q14
The human agreed to all four recommendations. This settles the remaining policy questions discussed so far. A final shared-understanding check and the existing routing-evidence prerequisite remain outstanding; this is not a final resolution.
The glossary now names usable voucher and voucher return, keeping acceptance, recipient intent, and safe-reassignment evidence distinct.
The prior agreements Q1–Q10 remain in force: one opaque permanent return address per assignment; reviewed initial batches; controlled ingress and approved full-content authentication; supported parsing; event-and-code deduplication; no inferred lineage/payment/fulfillment; review of uncertainty and finalized-event arrivals; and separate central checkouts unless every voucher can retain its distinct return address. Suitable accepted stock joins the event's common allocation pool under its established policy and purchase mode.
Outstanding verification
Obtain redacted evidence of successor-address routing remains open. Still needed: authorized seller checkout/configuration evidence establishing separate ticket-access and successor-address behavior, and a controlled-ingress observation establishing the chosen assignment alias survived delivery. Record the event/year and voucher class. Actual issuer signing/coverage and parser/class behavior also need event-specific evidence before automation is enabled.
No public documentation or supplied example so far proves this contract works with actual Congress checkout and mail. Do not invent fields, assume alias preservation, or waive the verification gates. This ticket remains open, with no map Decisions-so-far entry. The remaining evidence, detailed recovery, notification, authority, architecture, and prototype work are already represented by existing child tickets; no new independent decision ticket is identified at this checkpoint.
Discussion: Successor routing and incoming-voucher trust.